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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CANINE SEARCHES IN THE CLASSROOM
In recent years courts have grappled with the
problem of accommodating fourth amendment
principles to searches of students in public schools.
In Doe v. Renfrowl the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana confronted the
novel problem of the constitutionality of the use of
dogs trained to detect marijuana as an investigative
tool in classroom searches. The Doe court found no
constitutional infirmity in the use of dogs to sniff
all students in the junior and senior high schools in
Highland, Indiana, nor did it find fault with the
pocket searches of students to whom the dogs
"alerted.",2 The court did, however, invalidate a
nude search of a student conducted when a dog
continued to alert after a search of the student's
pockets failed to disclose any unlawful substance.
Principles that can consistently explain these
results are notably absent from the court's opinion.
The problems posed by the unique factual situa-
tion in Doe highlight the thorny constitutional
issues which have so far been sidestepped by deci-
sions in this area. It is unfortunate that the court
did not take the opportunity presented by the facts
in Doe to clarify these issues and to resolve them in
an intellectually coherent fashion.
The facts in Doe are important because they
distinguish the case from the clear line of prece-
dents in state and lower federal courts throughout
the country upholding warrantless searches by
school officials of students or their lockers. These
earlier decisions have been limited to searches of
the person or possessions of individuals already
suspected of possessing contraband. None has dealt
with an inspection of all students in a school or
with the use of dogs to sniff for the presence of
illegal substances.
3
'475 F. Suppl. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
2 "An alert is an indication of a trained canine that
the odor of the drug, in this case marijuana, is present in
the air or upon the individual." Id. at 1017 n.5.3 See notes 29-30 & 45-53 & accompanying text infra.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the searches at
issue have been upheld on findings of less than probable
cause. See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288
(S.D. Ill. 1977) (school official who searched student's
pockets on the basis of information provided by a student
source had reasonable cause to believe student possessed
drugs); In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1972) (vice principal, who sought police assistance to
conduct search of student's pockets after being informed
In response to increasingly widespread use of
drugs in the junior and senior high schools in
Highland, Indiana,4 members of the local school
board suggested the use of drug-detecting canines
to deal with the problem. Following a meeting
with the school board, school superintendant Ren-
frow decided to proceed with a plan to use dogs to
investigate drug use in the schools. Renfrow se-
cured the cooperation of the Highland Police De-
partment and of Patricia Little, an independent
trainer of drug-detecting canines. The police de-
partment agreed, on the insistence of school offi-
cials, that no criminal proceedings would be
brought as a result of evidence discovered during
the investigation. School officials, however, did
that student had sold drugs in school and after student
emptied pouch which contained $20, acted on "good
cause"); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. 1971) (vice
principal, who searched student's coat because student
was out of class without authorization and was known to
have experimented with drugs, acted on reasonable sus-
picion); Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1975)
(teacher who observed two boys by a tractor shed and
detected odor of marijuana acted reasonably in conduct-
ing search of their pockets); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488,
216 S.E.2d 586 (1975) (assistant principal who observed
furtive gestures on part of high school student acted
reasonably in asking student to empty pockets); Mercer
v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970) (principal
who searched student's pockets after receiving tip that
student possessed marijuana acted within the scope of his
in loco parentis authority). But see State v. Mora, 307 So.
2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809, on
remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976) (warrantless search of
a student's effects by a school official who suspected the
presence of marijuana violated fourth amendment). See
generally Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students
in Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739 (1974); Gardner,
Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 803
(1980); Phay & Rogister, Searches of Stndents and the Fourth
Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDuc. 57 (1976).
' In the six-month period between September 1978
and March 1979, school officials recorded 21 instances in
which students were found under the influence of drugs
or in possession of either drugs, drug paraphernalia or
alcohol. Thirteen of these instances occurred during a
four-week period. School officials, teachers and students
expressed concern about the problem because of its dis-
ruptive effect on the school, and some students indicated
that they felt pressure from their peers to engage in drug
use on campus. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1015-
16.
intend to bring disciplinary action against students
found in possession of illegal drugs.
The investigation was conducted on March 23,
1979. Students in both the junior and senior high
schools were instructed to remain in their first
period classrooms until the investigation, which
lasted about two and one-half hours, was com-
pleted.5 During that time, a canine team consisting
of a school administrator or teacher, a dog and
handler and a uniformed police officer went into
each classroom. 6 While the team was in the class-
room, students were asked to remain seated with
their hands and purses on their desk tops. The dog
handler introduced the dog and led it up and down
the aisles between the desks. The teams spent ap-
proximately five minutes in each classroom.
The dogs had been trained to "alert" when the
odor of marijuana was present in the air or on an
individual.7 Alerts occurred on approximately fifty
occasions during the investigation of the Highland
schools. Upon an alert, the student by whom the
alert was triggered8 was asked to empty his or her
pockets and/or purse. If the dog continued to alert,
a "body search" was conducted. The opinion does
not indicate where body searches were performed
or by whom. They involved, however, "extensive
examination of the student's clothing entailing the
removal of some of the garments." 9 Eleven students
were subjected to body searches. In addition, at
s Students who wished to use the washroom during the
investigation were permitted to do so accompanied by an
escort of the same sex to the washroom door. Id. at 1017.
'There is some ambiguity as to how many canine
teams were used and in which schools. The statement of
facts indicates that a total of six teams were used; four in
the high school and two in the junior high. Id. at 1016.
However, in a subsequent section, the court stated that
"[f]ourteen handlers and their dogs participated during
the inspection." Id. at 1018.
7 The opinion does not discuss the distance from the
odor within which the dogs will alert nor does it provide
any data concerning the reliability of these particular
dogs. The dogs were all trained and certified at Ms.
Little's academy. Ms. Little contacted handlers to ask
their assistance in the investigation. Each handler pro-
vided his own dog and participated in the investigation
as an unpaid volunteer. Id. at 1017. Other courts have
documented the reliability of trained dogs in detecting
drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Note, Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 973, 986-87 (1976).
8 The Doe opinion does not indicate whether there is
any ambiguity as to the source of the smell which triggers
an alert. One must presume that the dog's alerting signals
implicate one person and one person only, although there
is no evidence discussed in the opinion on this point.
9 Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1017 n.6.
least one student, 10 the plaintiff, was subjected to
a nude search. When a dog continued to alert to
Doe, she was escorted to the inner office of the
nursing station. Two women were present, one of
whom was a friend of Doe's mother. Upon inquiry,
Doe denied ever using marijuana. She then was
asked to undress with her back facing the two
women. After her clothing was examined and her
hair lifted, she was permitted to dress. No illegal
substances were found in her possession. It was
later learned that Doe had been playing with one
of her own dogs on the morning of the search and
that the dog was in heat. The reason for subjecting
Doe to a nude search rather than to a body search
was not explained.
During the investigation seventeen students were
found in possession of drugs and two in possession
of drug paraphernalia. Following the investigation
several parties brought suit against School Super-
intendant Renfrow and other school officials under
42 U.S.C. § 1983" for violation of their constitu-
tional rights. All party plaintiffs were dismissed
except Diane Doe and her parents.
12
I
The court separated the discussion of the consti-
tutional validity of the investigation into four is-
sues: (1) whether an investigatory inspection of all
students initiated by school officials for the purpose
of eliminating drug use within the school is a search
or seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment; (2) whether the use of drug-detecting dogs
to sniff students for the presence of marijuana is a
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment; (3) whether the search of a student's clothing
upon the alert of a trained dog violates the stu-
dent's rights under the fourth amendment; and (4)
whether a nude search following a similar alert
violates the student's rights under the fourth
amendment.'
3
'oThe opinion does not indicate whether other nude
searches were conducted.
1" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute.., of
any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
12 Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1014-15. Class
certification of all persons enrolled in Highland High
School and Highland Junior High School was denied. Id.
at 1028.
13 Id. at 1018.
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In considering the first issue, the court rejected
the contention that the action of school officials
constituted a "mass detention and deprivation of
freedom in violation of the Fourth Amendment,"'4
holding that because school officials have the au-
thority to regulate student schedules, no constitu-
tional claim is raised by the fact that the inspection
disrupted the students' ordinary class schedule.'
5
More importantly, the court held that "entry by
the school officials into each classroom for five
minutes was not a search contemplated by the
Fourth Amendment but, rather, was a justified
action taken in accordance with the in loco parentis
doctrine."' 6 The court noted further that this con-
clusion was unaffected by the presence of the police
officers, emphasizing that the police were present
at the request of the school officials and that no
police investigations or criminal proceedings re-
sulted.
17
The court treated separately the impact of the
presence of the dogs on the constitutionality of the
inspection and concluded that the action of the
dogs in walking up and down the aisles and sniffing
for the odor of marijuana also did not constitute a
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.18 The court advanced a number of perplex-
ing arguments in support of this conclusion. It
argued, first, that in the public school environment
the courts have not granted full application of
fourth amendment protections.' 9 Second, the court
argued that because of the nature of public edu-
cation and "because of the constant interaction
among students, faculty and school administra-
tors," 20 a student's expectation of privacy in the
public school setting is minimal. In addition, the
court relied on precedent to support its conclusion
that dog sniffs are not searches within the meaning
of the fourth amendment pointing out that all five
of the circuits which have considered the issue have
suggested that a dog's sniff of a person's possessions
is not a search within the meaning of the fourth







2o Id. at 1022.
21 Id. at 1020-21. The circuits which have considered
the issue include the First: United States v. Race, 529
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976) (dog alert to crate in airport
warehouse); the Second: United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1975) (sniff
search of baggage at airport); the Ninth: United States
v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976) (sniff search of semi-
ancing process between the individual student's
privacy rights and the school administrators' need
to protect all students and the educational process.
"Weighing the minimal intrusion [on students]
against the school's need to rid itself of the drug
problem, [the court concluded that] the actions of
the school officials leading up to an alert by one of
the dogs was reasonable and not a search for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. ' 'ss
Although the court found that the use of drug-
detecting dogs to sniff children for the presence of
marijuana was not a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment, it did find that a search
had occurred when a particular student was asked
to empty his or her pockets following a dog
"alert. ' ' 23 The court concluded, however, that be-
cause the dog's alert constituted "reasonable cause
to believe that the student was concealing narcot-
ics," 24 the search was reasonable and therefore no
fourth amendment violation had occurred. While
recognizing that the fourth amendment generally
precludes searches absent a warrant signed by a
neutral magistrate on a finding of probable cause,
the court argued that the requirement can be
modified by special circumstances, citing state
court decisions that have upheld warrantless
searches of students on less than probable cause.2
Applying the same "reasonable cause to believe"
standard, the court held that a nude search con-
ducted following a dog alert is an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.26 The court reasoned:
The continued alert by the trained canine alone is
insufficient to justify such a search because the
animal reacts only to the scent or odor of the
marijuana plant, not the substance itself.... There-
fore, the alert of the dog alone does not provide the
necessary reasonable cause to believe the student
actually possesses the drug.27
trailer); the Tenth: United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d
1003 (10th Cir. 1977) (sniff of rented locker in storage
company); and the D.C. Circuit: United States v. Fulero,
498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (sniff search of footlocker
at port of entry). However, only Fulero, Bronstein and
Venema unequivocally held that dog sniffs are not searches
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In Race
and Solis the courts decided that the dog sniffs were
reasonable under the circumstances and therefore did not
violate the fourth amendment.
22 475 F. Supp. at 1022.
2Id. at 1024.24 id.
25Id. at 1023.
26 Id. at 1024-25.
27 Id. at 1024 (emphasis in original).
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II
While the analysis in Doe is not inconsistent with
existing decisions in the area, it is unfortunate that
the court did not take the opportunity presented
by this novel factual situation to reassess the im-
portant constitutional issues raised by the use of
dogs to sniff students in the classroom. Instead, the
court relied on alternate theories which are some-
times inconsistent and other times ill-suited to the
facts before it, leaving the basis of its decision
opaque and the law regarding canine searches of
public school students in disarray. An additional
problem in the court's analysis is its failure to
confront the two distinguishing factual circum-
stances in Doe: the fact that the inspection was
directed at all students rather than at targeted
suspects and the fact that the dog sniffs were
directed at persons rather than at property. A
critical review of the rationales relied on by the Doe
court will make these problems apparent.
The court invoked the doctrine of in loco par-
entis to explain its holding that an investigatory
inspection of all students is not a fourth amend-
ment search.28 That doctrine allows school officials
to stand in the shoes of parents in their interactions
with school children. It has been criticized because
of its use as a theoretical buttress to justify actions
by school officials which abrogate rights tradition-
ally secured by the fourth amendment.' Neverthe-
less, many state courts relying on the doctrine have
upheld the authority of school officials to search
students when they have reasonable cause to be-
lieve the students possess illegal substances.30 In-
deed, some courts have upheld the use of police
assistance to conduct such searches.3 ' But in each
of these cases the school official had reasonable
cause to suspect the individual student of illegal
activity. Doe is the first case to present the question
of whether the in loco parentis doctrine allows
school officials to conduct an inspection of all
students on the basis of a reasonable belief that
some possess drugs. Yet the court avoided judging
the general inspection in Doe according to tradi-
2 8Id. at 1019.
29See Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1970) (Hughes, J., dissenting); Buss, supra note 3, at
765-68; Gardner, supra note 3, at 825.
3 See, e.g., M. v. Board of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 288
(S.D. Ill. 1977); In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 682 (1972); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319
N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284
N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
31 See, e.g., In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1972).
tional fourth amendment standards by holding
that the entry of school officials into the classrooms
to uncover drugs is not a search within the meaning
of the amendment. Thus, not only has the court
declined to impose greater scrutiny on generalized
inspections which might be thought to raise more
serious fourth amendment problems than searches
based on reasonable cause, it has removed them
from the scope of fourth amendment protection
altogether.
One of the fundamental principles underlying
the fourth amendment is that people will be left
alone to conduct their affairs free from state intru-
sion unless their actions raise suspicions of guilt.3 2
Should that principle be subverted in the context
of school inspections by simple manipulation of the
word "search" so that it does not encompass gen-
eral inspections to uncover contraband? General
inspections of adults even when they are limited to
a search for housing code violations rather than a
search for contraband are not accorded such defer-
ence.-" Is the doctrine of in loco parentis sufficiently
robust to serve as the theoretical basis for denying
to public school students this fundamental protec-
tion against government intrusion that is based
only on generalized suspicion? The court's discus-
sion offers no reassurance that it is.
Even more problematic is the court's treatment
of the issue of whether the use of dogs to sniff
students for the presence of marijuana constituted
a fourth amendment search. None of the other
theories that the court relied on is adequate to
support its conclusion that a dog's sniff of a student
is not a search. For example, the court's suggestion
that courts have not granted full application of
fourth amendment protections in the public
school34 is irrelevant to the issue of whether a dog's
sniff constitutes a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. The sniff of a person by a dog
either is a search or is not, irrespective of whether
the person is in or out of school.
The relevant standard for determining whether
there has been a fourth amendment search was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States.35 Katz held that a search occurs where there
has been an invasion of a person's "justifiable
reliance" on privacy. Applying that standard, the
Katz Court concluded that the use of an electronic
3 See Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979). See also
Gardner, supra note 3, at 845.
3 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
34 475 F. Supp. at 1020.
"5389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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monitoring device on the outside of a public tele-
phone booth was a search within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.3 6
The court in Doe suggested that Katz was in-
applicable to the facts before it because in Katz the
action in question was undertaken by police officers
whereas Doe involved action by school officials.
One wonders whether the court really meant to
suggest that what is a search when conducted by
the police might not be a search when conducted
by some other government official. This would
indeed be a novel position. It is true that a few
courts have held that a school official is not a
government official sufficient to trigger fourth
amendment protections.37 This, however, is appar-
ently not the Doe court's position, else there would
be no need for its discussion of whether the action
of school officials constituted a fourth amendment
search.
The court, however, did not end its discussion of
the justifiable expectation of privacy test by distin-
guishing Katz. The court also argued that because
of the nature of public schools, students' justifiable
privacy expectations while in school are minimal.38
This conclusion is too facile. While it may be that
students have lower expectations of privacy in
school than elsewhere, it is not meaningful to con-
clude that the privacy interest per se is minimal in
school. In balancing privacy interests against those
of the school to determine the reasonableness of the
search, the nature and strength of the privacy
interest is crucial in school as elsewhere.3 9 The Doe
court itself recognizes a student's strong privacy
interest in his own body, even in school.40
The privacy interest at issue in the context of the
dog sniffs is in protecting odors emanating from
one's person from intentional smelling by an-
other.4 As one commentator has suggested, this is
MId. at 353.
37 The fourth amendment is only applicable to searches
conducted by government officials. Burdeau v. Mc-
Dowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). For cases holding that
a school official is not a government official falling within
the ambit of the fourth amendment, see, e.g., In re Don-
aldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 510, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221
(1969); Mercet v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (rex. Ct.
App. 1970).
s 475 F. Supp. at 1022.
9 See United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 322
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Gardner, supra note 3, at 848-49.
40 475 F. Supp. at 1024.
41 It is possible to characterize the privacy interest at
issue in Doe differently. In fact, the court notes the lack
of an expectation of privacy in "the air around the
a strong interest: "[O]ne's smells are tied closely to
those bodily functions considered to be particularly
intimate., 42 Moreover, it is not an interest which
is in any way diminished by virtue of the fact that
one is in school. It is difficult to argue that one
assumes the risk of being purposely smelled simply
by entering a public school.
The court too was apparently unsatisfied with
the force of this analysis, for it adopted yet another
approach. It balanced and concluded that the
minimal intrusion of the students' privacy was
outweighed by the school officials' need to root out
drugs from the school environment. Therefore, the
court reasoned, there was no fourth amendment
search. 43 It is this "therefore" that is puzzling.
Under Katz the process of balancing the degree of
intrusion of privacy against the government's legit-
imate need is relevant only after it has been deter-
mined that a search has occurred.44 Balancing is
directed at the issue of whether the search was
reasonable, not at whether a search has occurred.
4
1
The court's position that a dog's sniff is not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment is not without precedential support. In fact
the court relied heavily on the circuit court deci-
sions which have concluded that a dog's sniff is not
a search.46 But again, the court failed to deal
satisfactorily with the two unique factual elements
in Doe which make those precedents dubious au-
thority for the court's holding.
First, in none of the previous cases was the dog's
-Aiff directed at a person. This is a significant
[students'] desks." Id. at 1022. This characterization par-
allels that adopted by the courts which have addressed
the issue of dog sniffs of objects. See United States v.
Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1005 (10th Cir. 1977) (air sur-
rounding rented locker in storage building); United
States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1976) (air
surrounding semi-trailer parked at rear of gasoline sta-
tion); United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748, 749 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (air surrounding foot lockers at port of entry).
However, this characterization fails to capture the ele-
ment of intentionality involved in the dog's sniff. It is not
the air to which the sniff is directed, but the smells
emanating from a particular person. Characterization of
the privacy interest as an interest in the air surrounding
one's person has the effect of minimizing what is likely to
be subjectively perceived as intrusive of one's dignity.42 Gardner, supra note 3, at 85.
43 475 F. Supp. at 1022.
44 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353-54.
45 See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 555-56 (1976); United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d
1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1976).
46 See note 21 supra.
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difference in light of the Katz "justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy test"' 47 and the differing privacy
interests at issue when one seeks to protect one's
possessions from public exposure and when one
seeks protection for smells emanating from one's
person. When one's possessions are smelled, even
intentionally, there is no threat to one's sense of
personal dignity. This is not so clear when one's
person is intentionally smelled.48
The court purported to deal with this difference
by noting that "[a]lthough each of those cases dealt
with the search of objects rather than of
persons... the same test of reasonableness
applies., 49 Such cursory treatment serves only to
blur the fine lines of distinction on which consti-
tutional differences rest. It may be that the subjec-
tive sense that one has been demeaned by the sniff
of a dog ultimately ought not to be constitutionally
significant. But one might wish for some recogni-
tion of the different interests at stake in sniffs of
people and of property and for careful considera-
tion of whether those differences merit different
constitutional treatment.
Second, in all but one of the existing decisions,
police officers relied on prior information to direct
the dogs to particular objects.as The Doe court
recognized this as an important factor but argued
that prior information was also present in Doe
because school officials only decided to use dogs in
their investigation after the upsurge of drug use in
the schools. Therefore, the court reasoned, school
officials had independent evidence that there were
drugs within the school.5 '
This argument is simply untenable. The inde-
pendent information in the earlier cases targeted
particular persons or objects as suspects. That is
very different from information which merely in-
dicates that drugs are being used in the schools.
47 See note 35 & accompanying text supra.
' See Gardner, supra note 3, at 850-51.
49475 F. Supp. at 1021.
50 In United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976),
the sniff search was conducted of all baggage in an
airport warehouse without advance reason to suspect the
particular crates to which the dogs alerted. But see People
v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977)
(Holding that an exploratory "search with canines con-
ducted without some preknowledge or reasonably strong
suspicion that contraband is to be found in a particular
location is a constitutionally impermissible invasion of
the suspects' reasonable expectations of privacy and con-
sequently a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
933, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 441); accord, People v. Williams, 51
Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
51475 F. Supp. at 1021.
Moreover, it was precisely the kind of situation in
Doe which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Bronstein52 was distinguishing when
it noted that, in the case before it, independent
reliable evidence of crime was available before dogs
were employed. The Bronstein court held that no
fourth amendment violation had occurred when
marijuana was discovered after dogs alerted to two
pieces of luggage in a group of about fifty pieces
held on the conveyor belt at an airport.ss In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court indicated that its
decision might have been different if no particular
individual had been suspected, commenting that
in the case before it, the dog "was not employed in
a dragnet operation directed against all flight pas-
sengers but rather [was employed] on the basis of
reliable information that reasonably triggered the
surveillance employed here."
' '
One is left then with the court's unsettling con-
clusion that the use of drug-detecting dogs to sniff
students for the presence of marijuana is not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. But on what basis does this conclusion rest?
Is it not a search because the fourth amendment
does not protect public school students? Because in
school there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy? Because the school's need to investigate
outweighs the student's privacy interest? Or be-
cause the sniff of a person is no different than the
sniff of an object and other circuits have concluded
that sniffs of objects are not searches? The court
did not indicate on which of these theories its
decision rested.
Similar ambiguity is present in the court's hold-
ing that no fourth amendment violation occurred
when a student's pockets were searched without a
warrant following a dog alert. This holding was
based on two premises. First, that in the context of
public school searches the lesser "reasonable cause
52521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918
(1975).
s3 521 F.2d at 463.
' Id. Of course it might be argued that the presence of
independent evidence of crime does not go to the issue of
whether or not a search has occurred but to the reason-
ableness of an acknowledged search. Such criticism could
fairly be leveled against the existing decisions in the area.
But even if the inquiry is addressed to the reasonableness
of the dog sniffs, assuming that a search has occurred,
there is a significant difference between a search directed
at persons suspected on the basis of reliable information
of illegal activity and a search of a group of people some
of whom are suspected of illegal activity. Under tradi-




to believe" standard may be substituted for the
usual "probable cause" standard and second, that
the warrant requirement can be modified by spe-
cial circumstances such as the in loco parentis
authority of school officials. Reasoning from these
premises, the court found that the reasonable cause
to believe standard was satisfied by the dog alert
and the search was therefore valid despite the
absence of a warrant.55
The authority for these premises derives from
state court decisions upholding warrantless
searches on less than probable cause. 56 While such
precedents indeed exist, they are contrary to the
basic constitutional rule that "searches conducted
outside thejudicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions., 5 7 Courts are not free to balance away
the interests promoted by search warrants when-
ever law enforcement interests are strong.s8 Unless
the court in Doe intended to hold that school
searches fall within, or are analogous to, one of the
"jealously and carefully drawn" 59 exceptions to the
warrant requirement, abrogation of that require-
ment is unjustified.60 But the court in Doe did not
argue that school searches fall within one of these
exceptions. Instead, it argued that the student's
fourth amendment privacy interest is modified by
the in loco parentis authority of school officials.
6
'
Is this, then, a holding that fourth amendment
protection does not extend to public school students
or rather that the school presents an additional
exception to add to the catalogue of those now
5 475 F. Supp. at 1022-24.
6Id. at 10-24.
s7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has yet to rule
on whether the fourth amendment prohibition against
warrantless searches and seizures applies to students in
public schools. See Phay & Rogister, supra note 3, at 58.
58 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-96 (1978);
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 628-33 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
59Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
6 See Gardner, supra note 3, at 823. Gardner discusses
the difficulties in trying to fit school searches within the
rubric of one of the well-established exceptions to the
warrant requirement and concludes that none of them
can plausibly support the application of lesser fourth
amendment standards to school searches. Id. at 823-25.61 475 F. Supp. at 1023.
exempt from the warrant requirement? The court
offered no guidance on this point.
An additional puzzle left by the court's analysis
is how to reconcile the holding that a warrantless
pocket search conducted following a dog alert is
valid under the fourth amendment with the hold-
ing that a nude search following such an alert is
not. No problem would be presented had the
court's analysis involved balancing the degree of
intrusion into a student's privacy against the school
official's legitimate need to remove illegal drugs
from the school. It is certainly possible to conclude
that the government's interest is sufficient to out-
weigh a student's interest in protecting the privacy
of his pockets whereas it is not sufficient to out-
weigh the student's interest in protecting the pri-
vacy of his body. But this was not the court's
approach. Instead the court argued that a dog alert
does not constitute reasonable cause to believe that
a student actually possesses marijuana because the
dog reacts to the scent of the drug rather than to
the substance itself.62 This analysis undercuts the
court's earlier argument that the "alert of the dog
constituted reasonable cause to believe that the
plaintiff was concealing narcotics ' ' 3 in her pocket.
How is it possible for the dog alert to provide
reasonable cause to believe that marijuana is con-
tained in a student's pocket but not elsewhere on
the student's person? In either case the dog's nose
is fallible. In either case the dog may react to the
lingering odor of marijuana rather than to the
substance itself.
III
The use of dogs to sniff students in the classroom
for the presence of marijuana raises important
constitutional issues which merit serious consider-
ation and careful resolution. With the increasing
problem of drug use on public school campuses, it
is incumbent upon the courts to delineate the scope
of fourth amendment protection in the public
schools so that school officials can deal with the
problem without infringing students' constitu-
tional rights. Perhaps future decisions will resolve
these constitutional issues in a manner that affords
clearer guidance to school officials struggling to
find solutions which fall within the scope of ill-
defined constitutional standards.
6
'Id. at 1024.
Sid.
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